Author:

Manoel Leonardo Santos

Abstract:

This work seeks to empirically verify whether the actions of interest groups influence the determination of political outcomes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The paper aims to measure the intensity of lobbying (independent variable) using two measures: (i) the lobbying initiatives of the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), interpreted here as corporate lobbying, and (ii) the lobbying carried out by non-corporate organizations, understood here as pluralist lobbying. The model also includes two more independent variables: (iii) the presence of opposition groups in the decision-making process and (iv) the rules of the decision-making process as an institutional variable. In an attempt to explain the legislative success of proposals of interest to the industrial sector in the Chamber of Deputies (dependent variable), the proposals included in the Industry Legislative Agenda for the period 1996-2010 were analyzed. The following were considered as control variables: (i) the legislative initiative on the part of the Executive and (ii) the type of change generated by the proposal. The results indicate that there is indeed an effective influence of lobbying on the results, but this influence is conditional, as supported by the literature. It is also concluded that industry lobbying is more effective within the scope of committees and this lobbying is more effective in creating a barrier to the entry of new legislation than when it tries to change the status quo in its favor. Finally, the work concludes that the synergy between the Executive Branch and the productive sector is the main determinant of industry success within the Legislative Branch.