Author: Manoel Santos

Abstract:

This work seeks to empirically verify whether the actions of interest groups influence the determination of political results in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. The paper seeks to measure the intensity of lobbying (independent variable) based on two measures: (i) the lobbying initiatives of the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) interpreted here as corporate lobbying and (ii) the lobbying carried out by extra-corporate organizations, here understood as a pluralist lobby. The model also includes two more independent variables: (iii) the presence of opposing groups in the decision-making process and (iv) the rules of the decision-making process as an institutional variable. In an attempt to explain the legislative success in propositions of interest to the industrial sector in the Chamber of Deputies (dependent variable), the propositions contained in the Industrial Legislative Agenda in the period 1996-2010 were analyzed. The following were considered as control variables: (i) the legislative initiative by the Executive and (ii) the type of change generated by the proposition. The results indicate that there is indeed an effective influence of lobbying on the results, but this influence is conditional, as supported by the literature. It is also concluded that industry lobbying is more effective at the committee level and this lobbying has more effect when creating a barrier to the entry of new legislation than when trying to change the status quo in its favor. Finally, the work concludes that the synergy between the Executive Branch and the productive sector is the main determinant of the industry’s success within the Legislative branch.