Authors:

Rui Fernando Correia Ferreira, Felipe Fróes Couto and Bruno de Almeida Vilela

Abstract:

The objective of this article was to analyze the modus operandi of influence strategy employed by JBS and Odebrecht to gain a
competitive advantage in their relationship with the State. This work proposes an advancement in the theoretical understanding
of “influence strategy” by differentiating it from the generic concept of “non-market strategy,” emphasizing the active and
intentional role of corporations in influencing decision-making processes for regulatory and legislative benefits. The modus
operandi of campaign contributions, lobbying, partisan platforms, and corruption is demonstrated. Content analysis was used to
examine over 35 hours of video with 27 executives from the respective companies. The study revealed that JBS and Odebrecht
developed sophisticated methods of political influence to manipulate political decisions and favor their commercial interests. This allowed the identification of a complex web of interactions and influences that these corporations exert on politics and governance.