

# Parties and Government: Party Behavior During the First Six Months of the Rousseff Administration in Brazil

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This article presents an assessment of party behavior during the first six months of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's administration. It analyzes 57 nominal and open voting sessions in the national Congress, 39 in the House of Representatives, and 18 in the Senate.

A comparison was also made of average legislative support for former President Luiz Lula in his first two terms: 2003 to 2006 and 2007 to 2010. The most important voting sessions of the Rousseff administration were the new minimum wage hike policy through 2015, adjustment of the price Brazil pays Paraguay for Itaipu electric power, summoning of former Civil Cabinet Minister Antonio Palocci to clarify accusations of illicit enrichment, votes on the Forestry Code and the differentiated contracting regime for construction of World Cup and Olympic venues, and the adjustment of the income tax table for individuals.

There were no nominal voting sessions in the House in March. From February to July, the government was defeated on only two votes in the House. It won all the others.

## Executive and Legislative Branches


The results of the assessment led to the following main conclusions regarding the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches during the first half of the year:

1. The House and Senate legislative agendas did not contain important votes, with the only highlights being the vote on the minimum wage, the Forestry Code, and the differentiated contracting regime.
2. Despite doubts regarding the relationship between the Rousseff administration and Congress, support for the president in the House was similar to that of former President Lula and was greater in the Senate.

3. The Labor Party (PT) was the most loyal to the government during the first term of the current administration, in the House (73.9%), and in the Senate (88.1%).
4. In the House, all parties gave more than 60% support for projects of interest to the government.
5. The Republican Party (PR) provided the least amount of support (61.0%).
6. In the Senate, with the exception of the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), the main parties also had loyalty rates above 60%.
7. In May and June, the level of support in the House was less than 50%.
8. In the Senate, monthly average support for the government from February through July was always greater than 50%.
9. In the House and Senate, the opposition used absences and obstructions to complicate voting on bills of interest to the government.
10. In the House, the state of Sergipe appears as the most loyal to the government (65.7%), followed by the Federal District (64.9%), and Bahia (63.1%). The PT governs in each of these. The states least aligned with the government were Sao Paulo (47.3%), and Rio Grande do North (42.0%), which are commanded by the opposition.

### House of Representatives

President Rousseff reached the end of her first six months in office with average support of 54.1% in the House of Representatives. This result is lower than average support for former President Lula during his first term (55.7%) but higher than during his second (51.2%), as seen in Figure 1. Lula banked on legislative support from the opposition during the first year of his government, which enabled him to govern unencumbered from 2003 to 2006.



**Figure 1. Average Support for the Government**  
*Source of all charts in this article: Arko Advice, 2011.*




Figure 2.

Table 1. Party Support of the Government

| Party | Lula 1 <sup>st</sup> Term<br>(2003–2006) | Lula 2 <sup>nd</sup> Term<br>(2007–2010) | Dilma Rousseff<br>1st Half of 2011 |
|-------|--|--|------------------------------------|
|       | In Favor, %                              |  |                                    |
| PT    | 77.6                                     | 75.1                                     | 73.9                               |
| PSB   | 68.7                                     | 62.8                                     | 70.0                               |
| PCdoB | 69.2                                     | 78.9                                     | 69.2                               |
| PTB   | 69.7                                     | 64.5                                     | 66.9                               |
| PP    | 58.3                                     | 63.8                                     | 64.3                               |
| PMDB  | 57.0                                     | 63.7                                     | 64.1                               |
| PDT   | 44.6                                     | 69.8                                     | 63.5                               |
| PR    | 71.5                                     | 64.0                                     | 61.0                               |

During the first half of 2011, support for the government reached its highest level in February (63.8%), the first month of legislative activity of the current administration (Figure 2). It was during that month that the bill of law was voted on postponing the new hike policy for the minimum wage until the beginning of 2015. The majority of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) bench voted in line with the President's Palace (*Planalto*) to show its commitment to Rousseff.

Of the main allies in the government's coalition, the PT had the highest level of support for the government during the first six months, with a rate of 73.9%, as seen in Table 1. The Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) was in second place, with 70.0%, followed by the Brazilian Communist Party (PCdoB) (69.2%). The PMDB had 64.1%, and the least loyal, the PR, was 61.0%. During Lula's first term, the party most aligned with the *Planalto* was the PT (77.58%); during the second term, the PCdoB took over that position (78.9%).

As Table 2 shows, the opposition was more supportive of Lula during his first term, especially during the first year, 2003. The behavior of the PSDB and the Democrats (DEM) during the first half of the year was similar to their behavior

**Table 2. Party Support for the Government**

| Party | Lula 1 <sup>st</sup> Term<br>(2003–2006) | Lula 2 <sup>nd</sup> Term<br>(2007–2010) | Dilma Rousseff<br>1 <sup>st</sup> Half of 2011 |
|-------|--|--|--|
|       | In Favor, %                              |  |  |
| PSDB  | 24.8                                     | 6.7                                      | 7.2  |
| DEM   | 24.2                                     | 10.4                                     | 11.6   |
| PPS   | 67.2                                     | 13.3                                     | 19.1   |
| PSOL  | 38.2                                     | 39.1                                     | 22.2   |

**Table 3. Support of Opposition Parties for Government**

| Region    | In favor | Against | Absent | Abstention | Obstruction | Art. 17* |
|-----------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-------------|----------|
|           | %        |         |        |            |             |          |
| Midwest   | 55.3     | 14.6    | 26.5   | 0.5        | 3.0         | 0.0      |
| North     | 54.4     | 10.9    | 31.2   | 0.4        | 3.1         | 0.0      |
| Northeast | 56.8     | 10.1    | 30.1   | 0.4        | 2.5         | 0.1      |
| South     | 51.7     | 11.3    | 32.5   | 0.5        | 2.8         | 1.2      |
| Southeast | 52.2     | 13.5    | 30.3   | 0.6        | 3.3         | 0.1      |

\*Art. 17: the House chairman does not vote.

during the former president's second term. The Popular Socialist Party (PPS) was more sympathetic toward the Rousseff administration during the first half of the year than in Lula's second term (Table 2).

Regionally, Northeastern representatives appear to be loyal to the Rousseff administration. The percentage in favor in the Northeast in the first half of the year was 56.8%. The least loyal were in the South region, with a support percentage of 51.7% (Table 3).

The state of Sergipe is the most loyal to the government (65.7%), followed by the Federal District (64.9%), Bahia (63.1%), and Mato Grosso (61.2%). The PT governs the three states most aligned with the *Planalto* Palace: Marcelo Deda (SE), Agnelo Queiroz (DF), and Jaques Wagner (BA). The states least aligned with the government were São Paulo (47.3%) and Rio Grande do North (42.0%), led by the opposition: Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) and Rosalba Ciarlini (DEM), respectively (Table 4).

Table 5 shows a behavior summary of all parties in the House of Representatives during voting sessions of interest to the government during the first half of 2011.

### Federal Senate

Former President Lula faced difficulties passing bills in the Senate during his two mandates because of the balance of forces between the government and the opposition. On average, his base was made up of 50 senators. The remaining 81 senators were opposition or independent. During voting on the excise tax (CPMF),

Table 4. State Loyalty to the Government

| State               | In favor | Against | Absent | Abstention | Obstruction | Art. 17* |
|---------------------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-------------|----------|
|                     | %        |         |        |            |             |          |
| Acre                | 52.6     | 13.8    | 32.4   | 0.0        | 1.3         | 0.0      |
| Alagoas             | 57.0     | 6.3     | 33.0   | 0.8        | 2.8         | 0.0      |
| Amazonas            | 57.4     | 9.9     | 31.4   | 0.3        | 1.0         | 0.0      |
| Amapá               | 53.3     | 9.2     | 31.3   | 0.0        | 6.1         | 0.0      |
| Bahia               | 63.1     | 10.6    | 23.1   | 0.3        | 2.8         | 0.0      |
| Ceará               | 59.1     | 7.7     | 32.0   | 0.2        | 0.9         | 0.0      |
| Distrito Federal    | 64.9     | 20.5    | 13.7   | 0.0        | 0.8         | 0.0      |
| Espírito Santo      | 54.9     | 11.0    | 28.2   | 0.0        | 3.3         | 2.6      |
| Goiás               | 49.4     | 13.8    | 33.2   | 0.4        | 3.2         | 0.0      |
| Maranhão            | 47.5     | 8.7     | 39.7   | 1.2        | 2.9         | 0.0      |
| Minas Gerais        | 50.1     | 12.3    | 33.8   | 1.0        | 2.7         | 0.0      |
| Mato Grosso do Sul  | 49.3     | 15.9    | 29.3   | 0.8        | 4.5         | 0.0      |
| Mato Grosso         | 61.2     | 8.0     | 26.3   | 1.0        | 3.5         | 0.0      |
| Pará                | 58.3     | 7.9     | 31.    | 0.2        | 2.3         | 0.0      |
| Paraíba             | 59.4     | 10.7    | 29.1   | 0.0        | 0.8         | 0.0      |
| Pernambuco          | 51.7     | 12.2    | 32.9   | 0.4        | 2.4         | 0.4      |
| Piauí               | 57.9     | 6.7     | 30.8   | 0.5        | 4.1         | 0.0      |
| Paraná              | 48.4     | 14.8    | 32.2   | 0.2        | 4.3         | 0.0      |
| Rio de Janeiro      | 59.2     | 12.4    | 25.7   | 0.2        | 2.5         | 0.0      |
| Rio Grande do Norte | 42.0     | 16.0    | 37.8   | 0.3        | 3.8         | 0.0      |
| Rondônia            | 52.6     | 8.1     | 38.0   | 0.8        | 0.4         | 0.0      |
| Roraima             | 51.9     | 14.8    | 24.5   | 1.6        | 7.1         | 0.0      |
| Rio Grande do Sul   | 54.8     | 8.3     | 33.1   | 0.3        | 0.8         | 2.6      |
| Santa Catarina      | 50.5     | 12.2    | 31.6   | 1.2        | 4.5         | 0.0      |
| Sergipe             | 65.7     | 7.4     | 25.3   | 0.3        | 1.3         | 0.0      |
| São Paulo           | 47.3     | 16.3    | 31.2   | 0.5        | 4.6         | 0.0      |
| Tocantins           | 52.1     | 12.5    | 31.2   | 0.0        | 4.2         | 0.0      |

\*Art. 17: the House chairman does not vote.

when the government achieved 45 votes in favor (at least 49 were necessary), it became evident on whom the government could count in the Senate.

Rousseff has a more favorable scenario. Her base is made up of 61 senators. The opposition has a total of 20 votes. Average support for bills of interest to the government closed the month of July at 55.2%, higher than the 48.7% during Lula's second term (Figure 3).


Average support for the government in the Senate in 2011 was always higher than 50% (Figure 4). As in the House, the record high was in February, when the bill that outlined the minimum wage hike policy was passed. As this was a crucial issue for the *Planalto*, there was intense political coordination mobilization to guarantee an expressive victory in the Rousseff administration's first test.

The PT closed the first half of the year in the Senate as most loyal toward the government. The percentage is higher than that recorded in Lula's second term. Whereas in the House, the PR was the least loyal party to the *Planalto*, in the Senate,

**Table 5. Parties in the House of Representatives, 2011**

| Party | Bench | In favor | Against | Absent | Abstention | Obstruction | Art. 17* |
|-------|-------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-------------|----------|
|       | n     | %        |         |        |            |             |          |
| PT    | 88    | 73.9     | 2.6     | 22.2   | 0.3        | 0.0         | 0.9      |
| PMDB  | 79    | 64.1     | 6.4     | 28.7   | 0.4        | 0.1         | 0.2      |
| PSDB  | 53    | 7.2      | 38.4    | 39.2   | 1.1        | 14.1        | 0.0      |
| DEM   | 43    | 11.6     | 33.0    | 38.8   | 1.1        | 15.3        | 0.0      |
| PP    | 41    | 64.3     | 5.1     | 30.3   | 0.2        | 0.1         | 0.0      |
| PR    | 40    | 61.0     | 4.2     | 34.2   | 0.2        | 0.1         | 0.2      |
| PSB   | 30    | 70.0     | 3.7     | 26.0   | 0.2        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PDT   | 27    | 63.5     | 9.8     | 25.4   | 0.3        | 1.0         | 0.0      |
| PTB   | 21    | 66.9     | 5.7     | 27.1   | 0.1        | 0.1         | 0.0      |
| PSC   | 19    | 60.5     | 10.8    | 28.4   | 0.0        | 0.3         | 0.0      |
| PCdoB | 15    | 69.2     | 4.6     | 26.1   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PV    | 14    | 45.4     | 18.1    | 28.7   | 2.6        | 5.1         | 0.0      |
| PPS   | 12    | 19.1     | 40.6    | 32.6   | 0.4        | 7.2         | 0.0      |
| PRB   | 12    | 74.5     | 5.4     | 19.7   | 0.4        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PMN   | 4     | 51.8     | 9.7     | 37.2   | 0.0        | 1.2         | 0.0      |
| PTdoB | 4     | 65.4     | 1.9     | 32.7   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PSOL  | 3     | 22.2     | 47.9    | 19.6   | 0.0        | 10.2        | 0.0      |
| PHS   | 2     | 73.1     | 7.7     | 17.9   | 1.3        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PRTB  | 2     | 57.7     | 2.6     | 39.7   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PSL   | 2     | 75.9     | 7.4     | 16.7   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PRP   | 1     | 70.5     | 3.3     | 26.2   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PTC   | 1     | 53.8     | 2.6     | 43.6   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |

\*Art. 17: the House chairman does not vote.



**Figure 3. Federal State Average Support for the Government**

the least loyal party was the PDT, not because it voted against the government but because it had a significant rate of absence (45.8%). The PMDB, the party of Romero Jucá (Roraima—RR), the government leader in the Senate, is the runner-up, with the second worst rate of support for the *Planalto* (60.6%). Nonetheless, performance was better than during the Lula administration (57.5%) (Table 6).




Figure 4. Senate Support for the Government, 2011

Table 6. Party Votes in Support of the Executive Government in the Senate

| Party | Lula—2 <sup>nd</sup> term<br>(2007–2010) | Dilma Rousseff<br>1 <sup>st</sup> half of 2011 |
|-------|--|--|
|       | In favor, %                              |  |
| PT    | 77.33                                    | 88.10  |
| PSB   | 78.87                                    | 87.03  |
| PCdoB | 72.22                                    | 77.77  |
| PP    | 76.00                                    | 74.44  |
| PTB   | 67.44                                    | 71.29  |
| PR    | 72.16                                    | 65.16  |
| PMDB  | 57.547                                   | 60.64  |
| PDT   | 53.39                                    | 36.11  |

Opposition parties considerably increased the percentage of votes against the government between Lula's second term and the first half of the year of the Rousseff administration (Table 7). The PPS did not have a representative in the Senate during Lula's second term. The percentage of votes contrary to the Rousseff administration may give the impression that it was the party that least often voted against the *Planalto*. In fact, Senator Itamar Franco, the only PPS Senator, had serious health problems and died. Because of his sick leave, Franco was absent for 71.4% of the voting sessions analyzed.

Table 8 shows the behavior of all political parties with representation in the Senate.

### Parties and Government

An assessment of the behavior of the twelve main political parties of the Rousseff administration for the first half of the year follows.

Table 7. Opposition Votes

| Party | Lula—2 <sup>nd</sup> term<br>(2007–2010) | Dilma Rousseff—<br>1st half of 2011 |
|-------|--|-------------------------------------|
|       | Against, %                               |                                     |
| PSDB  | 58.30                                    | 75.00                               |
| DEM   | 50.28                                    | 53.33                               |
| PPS   | —  | 28.57                               |
| PSOL  | 24.00                                    | 58.33                               |

Table 8. Behavior of Parties in the Senate

| Party | Bench | In Favor | Against | Absent | Abstention | Obstruction | Art. 51* |
|-------|-------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-------------|----------|
|       |       | %        |         |        |            |             |          |
| PMDB  | 20    | 60.6     | 10.2    | 21.9   | 3.5        | 0.0         | 3.8      |
| PT    | 14    | 88.1     | 0.0     | 9.7    | 0.7        | 0.0         | 1.5      |
| PSDB  | 10    | 1.6      | 75.0    | 22.8   | 0.5        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PTB   | 6     | 71.3     | 3.7     | 25.0   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| DEM   | 5     | 3.3      | 53.3    | 41.1   | 2.2        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PP    | 5     | 74.4     | 7.7     | 17.8   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PR    | 5     | 65.2     | 4.5     | 29.2   | 1.1        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PDT   | 4     | 36.1     | 15.3    | 45.8   | 2.8        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PSB   | 3     | 87.0     | 0.0     | 23.0   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PCdoB | 2     | 77.8     | 0.0     | 16.7   | 2.8        | 0.0         | 2.8      |
| PSOL  | 2     | 11.1     | 58.3    | 27.8   | 0.0        | 2.8         | 0.0      |
| PSC   | 1     | 61.1     | 0.0     | 33.3   | 5.6        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PV    | 1     | 66.7     | 0.0     | 27.8   | 5.6        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PPS** | 1     | 0.0      | 28.6    | 71.4   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PRB   | 1     | 66.7     | 0.0     | 27.8   | 5.6        | 0.0         | 0.0      |
| PMN   | 1     | 61.1     | 0.0     | 38.9   | 0.0        | 0.0         | 0.0      |

\*Art. 51: the Senate chairman does not vote.

\*\*The PPS currently has no representative in the Senate. The percentage shown here refers to voting sessions with former Senator Itamar Franco.

### Labor Party (PT)

During Lula's first term, the PT had its greatest rate of support for the government (77.6%). During the second term, it reached 75.1%, and during the first half of the Rousseff administration, it peaked at 74.0% (Figure 5). During Lula's first year, in light of the resistance of some members of the PT in relation to proposals presented by the former president (such as the Social Security and tax reforms), the party cast 6.3% of votes against the *Planalto* Palace.

In the Senate, the PT bench's loyalty rate during the first half of the year was higher than during Lula's second term, with a difference of almost 10 percentage points (Figure 6).



### House of Representatives PT Legislative Support for the Government




Figure 5.

### Senate PT Legislative Support for the Government




Figure 6.

In July, the PT provided its worst rate of support for the *Planalto* (64.2%) in the House. The explanation is that absences increased considerably, from 22.7% in June to 34.1% in July. There was record support in February, when the party voted 82.2% in line with the Executive Branch (Figure 7).

### House of Representatives Average PT support for the government - %




Figure 7.

### Senate Average PT support for the government - %




Figure 8.

In the Senate, average support was never less than 80% (Figure 8). The lowest level was recorded in March (82.2%). The highest rate of support was in February (96.7%). The PT bench concluded the first six months of the Rousseff administration as the most loyal party to the *Planalto*.

### House of Representatives Compared PMDB behavior - %




Figure 9.

#### Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)

Historically, the PMDB has consistently increased its support percentage in relation to the government. During the 2003 to 2006 period, the party average in the House was 57.0%. During the four-year period from 2007 to 2010, it was 63.7%. In the first six months of the Rousseff administration, it reached a record 64.1% (Figure 9).

In the Senate, the PMDB's attitude toward bills of interest to the government also improved in the Rousseff administration from Lula's second term. Support went from 57.5% to 60.6% (Figure 10).

The party's best rate in the House was in February (78.9%). The PMDB was also responsible for the government's biggest defeat in the House of Representatives, in Forestry Code voting. Going against orientation of the president, the party submitted an amendment to Representative Aldo Rebelo's (PCdoB-São Paulo) report and achieved the support of the majority of the floor. Voting took place in May, the month PMDB's support hit its lowest level of the first half of the year (55.1%) (Figure 11).

In April, PMDB Senators presented their lowest level of support for the *Planalto*. In that month, there were three nominal voting sessions in the Senate addressing Provisional Measure (PM) 510/10, which regulates compliance with tax obligations by consortia that conduct legal business under their own name, and PM 511/10, providing for the High-Speed Train (TAV). During the other months, the party's average support was always greater than 60% (Figure 12).

#### Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB)

In comparing the first six months of the Rousseff administration with Lula's second term, the PSDB absence percentage fell from 43.1% to 39.2%, but its




Figure 10.




Figure 11.

percentage of contrary votes increased from 32.1% to 38.4%. The percentage of favorable PSDB votes toward the government from February to July in the House was small (7.2%) (Figure 13).

In the Senate, comparing Lula’s second term with the first six months of the Rousseff administration, the percentage of Toucan (members of the PSDB Party)

### Senate Average PMDB support for the Government - %




Figure 12.

### House of Representatives Compared PSDB behavior - %




Figure 13.

votes contrary to the Palace increased considerably at the same time that favorable votes dropped (Figure 14).

In February and June, the PSDB offered reasonable levels of support for the government, taking into consideration that it is the government's main

### Senate Compared PSDB behavior - %




Figure 14.

### House of Representatives Average PSDB support for the Government - %




Figure 15.

adversary and observing the level of support during the other months (Figure 15). The minimum wage hike was voted on in February. The fact that some of the party’s governors did not agree with the increase defended by representatives (R\$600 against the R\$545 proposed by the *Planalto*) partially




Figure 16.

explains the support of 10.8% of the party. In June, the differentiated contracting regime was voted on. Governors interested in forging ahead with plans for World Cup and Olympics construction pressured some of their allies to vote in favor of the measure.

In February, the opposition voted against the government, against the President, in 90% of votes (Figure 16). Beginning in May, the percentage of contrary votes dropped as absences increased. One of the opposition's strategies to hinder deliberations in Congress was to not appear at sessions so that there was not a quorum for deliberations. The government was obliged to mobilize its base to guarantee a minimum number of senators (41) for issues to be considered.

### Democrats (DEM)

As did the PSDB, the Democrats supported some of the initiatives that former President Lula submitted during the first year of his term, which led the party to have 24.2% support during the first term. However, from 2007 to 2010, this percentage dropped to 10.4%, ending the first half of the year at 11.6% (Figure 17).

In the Senate, the percentage of DEM contrary votes during the first half of the Rousseff administration changed little from Lula's second term, from 50.283 to 53.3% (Figure 18). Absences increased significantly, from 18.5% to 41.1%.

From February to June, the DEM's support for the *Planalto* was above average (Figure 19). The explanation is the same as given for the PSDB during voting on

### House of Representatives Compared DEM behavior - %




Figure 17.

### Senate Compared DEM behavior - %




Figure 18.

the minimum wage bill (February) and the differentiated contracting regime (June).

The Democrats' behavior was not uniform in the Senate during the first half of 2011. The percentage of contrary votes increased or diminished depending on the presence of party senators during voting sessions (Figure 20).



### House of Representatives Average DEM support for the Government - %




Figure 19.

### Senate Average DEM support for the Government - %




Figure 20.

### Progressive Party (PP)

At the same time that the party gradually increased its support in the House for government projects since Lula’s first term, the percentage of contrary votes also

### House of Representatives Compared PP behavior - %




Figure 21.

dropped. From 2003 to 2006, average party support was 58.3%. It increased to 63.8% during the second term and ended the first half of 2011 at 64.3% (Figure 21).

In the Senate, the bench’s behavior toward the government was uniform. The party ended the first half of the year with a support rate of 74.4%. During Lula’s second term, the average was 76% (Figure 22).

In February, the PP recorded its highest level of support for the government in the House. Over the following months, the support percentage remained stable at approximately 60% (Figure 23). The party ended the first half of the year as the fifth most loyal to the *Planalto* in the House of the main allies.

In April, the PP had a 100% rate of support for the *Planalto*. Behind the PT, PSB, and PCdoB, the party ended the first half of the year as the fourth most loyal to the Executive Branch in the Senate (Figure 24).

### Republican Party (PR)

The PR has had a declining rate of support since Lula’s first term, when the degree of support reached 71.5%. During the second term, this percentage dropped to 64.0% and then to 61.0% by the end of the first months of the Rouseff administration (Figure 25). The increase in absences in voting sessions of interest to the government caused this decline.

PR support for the Rouseff administration ended the first half of the year at 65.2% in the Senate (Figure 26). This is the third worst rate, behind only the PMDB and PDT.

Among the main allied base parties, the PR had the worst level of support for the *Planalto* Palace during the first six months in the House. In February, the party recorded 75% support. Over the following months, the support percentage was less than 60%, with the exception of July (60%) (Figure 27).

### Senate Compared PP behavior - %




Figure 22.

### House of Representatives Average PP support for the Government - %




Figure 23.

The party kicked off February with a support rate of 80.9% in the Senate, dropped over the following months, and reached its lowest level in May (40%). It started to increase in June, and in July, the last month of legislative activities before the recess, it ended with 80% (Figure 28).

### Senate Average PP support for the Government - %




Figure 24.

### House of Representatives Compared PR behavior - %




Figure 25.

### Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)

Comparing average PSB support during the first half year of the Rouseff administration with support during Lula’s two terms, the best results of the party’s level of support was in 2011 (70.0%) (Figure 29). It was the second




Figure 26.




Figure 27.

most loyal party to the *Planalto* Palace from January to July, behind only the PT.

There were no PSB votes against the government in the voting sessions analyzed by Arko Advice during Lula’s second term and in the first half of the year of the Rousseff administration. The party ended the six months with a rate of

### Senate Average PP support for the Government - %




Figure 28.

### House of Representatives Compared PSB behavior - %




Figure 29.

87.0% and was thus the second most loyal party toward the *Planalto* during the period, behind only the PT (Figure 30).

In the house, the party initiated the year with a support rate of 83.1% for projects of interest to the *Planalto*. Following that, the best rate was in May (72.8%). It closed the month of June at 65% (Figure 31).




Figure 30.




Figure 31.

The PSB had a 100% support rate for the *Planalto* four times in the Senate. Absences in March and June were responsible for a drop in the support percentage for bills of interest to the government, with the worst result in March (44.4%) (Figure 32).




Figure 32.

**Democratic Labor Party (PDT)**

During Lula’s first term, average PDT support was 44.6%. It increased significantly during the second, when it reached 69.8%. It closed the first half of 2011 at 63.5% (Figure 33). After the PR, it was the party with the worst performance. At the beginning of the year, there was friction between the party and the government regarding voting on the minimum wage. During voting in the House, the PDT threatened to support a minimum wage of R\$560, and the *Planalto* Palace was annoyed by the dubious posture of Minister of Labor Carlos Lupi, who told members of the PT that “he was embarrassed for having to support a proposal (a R\$545 minimum wage) that went against the party statute and Getúlio Vargas’s testament letter.” (We have no access to this document; this statement is a matter of public knowledge.)

In the Senate, the PDT was the party with the worst rate of support for the *Planalto* (36.1%), the reason being the high rate of absences (45.8%) (Figure 34).

In February, average support for the *Planalto* reached its highest level (81.0%). It dropped drastically in April, to 54%, and closed in July at 53.7% (Figure 35).

In March, the PDT’s absence in the Senate reached an incredible rate of 83.3% (Figure 36). It was precisely the month following friction between Labor Minister Carlos Lupi and the *Planalto* Palace over minimum wage voting.

**Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)**

The party has provided constant levels of support for the government. During Lula’s first term, support levels reached 69.7%. They ended the 2006–2010 period with 64.5% and concluded the first half of the year with 66.9% (Figure 37). Following the historic alliance in the PT (PSB and PCdoB), it was the most loyal party during the first few months of the Rousseff administration.



### House of Representatives Compared PDT behavior - %




Figure 33.

### Senate Compared PDT behavior - %




Figure 34.

### House of Representatives Average PDT support for the Government - %




Figure 35.

### Senate Average PDT support for the Government - %




Figure 36.

### House of Representatives Compared PTB behavior - %




Figure 37.

The PTB has also demonstrated stable behavior in the Senate. Party support for the Rousseff administration ended the term at 71.3%, higher than the 67.4% given during Lula's second term (Figure 38).

PTB support was lower than 60% only when the government was defeated in Forestry Code voting (Figure 39). During the other months it was always above 65%.

In the Senate, the lowest level of support for the *Planalto* was in March (55.5%). PTB's record was in February, when party support for the Executive Branch reached 87.5% (Figure 40).

### Popular Socialist Party (PPS)

The PPS initiated Lula's first term with extremely high support (67.2%). The party was part of the allied base and commanded the Ministry of National Integration through Ciro Gomes. It then went over to the opposition. This explains the drop in support percentage, which plummeted to 13.3% during Lula's second term and was 19.1% during the first half of 2011 (Figure 41).

Despite the fact that it made up part of the opposition and was critical of the government, PPS's behavior during voting on issues of interest to the government was not radical. For example, in April, the party's support percentage for the Executive Branch was 21.8% (Figure 42).

The PPS had no representative in the Senate during Lula's second term. During that legislature, the only party representative was former Senator Itamar Franco, who died in July. For health reasons, he was absent for a large portion of the voting sessions, and we did not analyze party behavior in the Senate.




Figure 38.




Figure 39.

### Green Party (PV)

The Green Party, which had the command of the Ministry of the Environment under Gilberto Gil during Lula’s administration, provided a 54.5% rate of support for the *Planalto*. During the Rousseff administration, with a more independent posture, the party ended the first half of the year with 45.4% (Figure 43).




Figure 40.




Figure 41.

Analysis of the PV's monthly behavior shows that it was independent of the *Planalto*. For example, the party's average rate of support was 72.3% in June and 14.3% in July (Figure 44).

The PV has only one representative in the Senate, Paulo Davim. During Lula's second term, only former Senator Marina Silva represented the party in the Senate.

### House of Representatives Average PPS support for the Government - %




Figure 42.

### House of Representatives Compared PV behavior - %




Figure 43.

### Brazilian Communist Party (PCdoB)

The party ended the first half of the year with an average rate of support of 69.2% in the House, exactly the same percentage recorded during Lula’s first term (Figure 45).

### House of Representatives Average PV support for the Government - %




Figure 44.

### House of Representatives Compared PCdoB behavior - %




Figure 45.

### Senate Compared PCdoB behavior - %




Figure 46.

In the Senate, the PCdoB ended the first half of the year as the third most loyal party to the Rousseff administration, behind the PT and PSB. The party’s rate of support for the period was 77.8%, in comparison with 72.2% during Lula’s second term (Figure 46).

In the House, the PCdoB’s rate of support for the government was 82.5%. After that, its highest rate was in May (66.7%), when voting on the Forestry Code (Figure 47).

In the Senate, the lowest PCdoB rate of support for the *Planalto* was in June, when it dropped to 57.1% (Figure 48). During the other months, it was always more than 80%, and in May and June it reached 100%.

### About the Authors

Murillo de Aragão is an attorney. He has a Master’s Degree in Political Science and a Doctorate in Sociology from the Universidade de Brasília. He has been a university professor and an international lecturer and is author of dozens of articles and political studies. He is a columnist at *Brasil Econômico* newspaper and a member of the Social and Economic Development Council of the Presidency of the Republic.

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### House of Representatives Average PCdoB support for the Government - %




Figure 47.

### Senate Average PCdoB support for the Government - %




Figure 48.

### Reference

Arko Advice. (2011). Parties and Government: Party Behavior during the First Six Months of the Rousseff Administration. *Political Scenarios*, 163, August.

## Annex I

## House of Representatives—Voting Sessions Analyzed, 2011

| Date | Bill      | Topic                  | Issue   | Score                                 | Result   | Government |
|------|-----------|------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| 2/15 | PL 382/11 | Minimum wage           | Emergency request   | Yes: 391<br>No: 22<br>Abstention: 3   | Approved | Won        |
| 2/16 | PL 382/11 | Minimum wage           | PSDB DVS proposed R\$600 to replace the R\$545 proposed by the Executive Branch | Yes: 106<br>No: 376<br>Abstention: 7  | Rejected | Won        |
| 2/16 | PL 382/11 | Minimum wage           | DEM proposal for a R\$560 minimum wage  | Yes: 120<br>No: 361<br>Abstention: 11 | Rejected | Won        |
| 2/17 | PL 382/11 | Minimum wage           | PPS DVS to avoid having the minimum wage defined by decree                      | Yes: 350<br>No: 117<br>Abstention: 2  | Rejected | Won        |
| 2/22 | MP 502/10 | Financing for athletes | Request to remove from agenda   | Yes: 2<br>No: 269<br>Abstention: 4    | Rejected | Won        |
| 2/22 | MP 502/10 | Financing for athletes | Request to delay for one session  | Yes: 5<br>No: 282<br>Abstention: 3    | Rejected | Won        |
| 2/22 | MP 502/10 | Financing for athletes | Request to remove from agenda   | Yes: 14<br>No: 309<br>Abstention: 2   | Approved | Won        |

|      |           |  |  |                                     |          |     |
|------|-----------|--|--|-------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| 2/23 | MP 503/10 | Creation of public Olympic authority (APO) | Request to remove from agenda  | Yes: 0<br>No: 276<br>Abstention: 3  | Rejected | Won |
| 4/05 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | Request to remove from agenda  | Yes: 7<br>No: 248<br>Abstention: 2  | Rejected | Won |
| 4/05 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | Request for time extension   | Yes: 12<br>No: 298                  | Rejected | Won |
| 4/05 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | Request to remove from agenda  | Yes: 7<br>No: 267                   | Rejected | Won |
| 4/05 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | Request to conclude discussions and submit to voting   | Yes: 271<br>No: 11<br>Abstention: 1 | Approved | Won |
| 4/06 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | PSDB DVS, targeted at removing authorization for the Executive Branch to create the <i>Empresa de Transporte Ferroviário de Alta Velocidade S.A. (Etav)</i> from the PM (Provisional Measures)   | Yes: 213<br>No: 68                  | Rejected | Won |
| 4/06 | MP 511/10 | High-speed train (TAV)                     | Remove authorization given to the executive branch to abate up to R\$20 billion from the National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) debt balance in exchange for the provisions made by the bank to cover dubious liquidation credits | Yes: 203<br>No: 68                  | Rejected | Won |
| 4/06 | PDC 2600  | Itaipu                                     | Increases the amount paid to Paraguay for electric power from the Itaipu plant to US\$360 million  | Yes: 336<br>No: 34                  | Approved | Won |

**Annex I**  
**Continued**

| Date | Bill      | Topic   | Issue   | Score                               | Result   | Government |
|------|-----------|---|---|-------------------------------------|----------|------------|
| 4/06 | PDC 2600  | Itaipu  | Request to remove from agenda   | Yes: 11<br>No: 286<br>Abstention: 2 | Rejected | Won        |
| 4/06 | PDC 2600  | Itaipu  | Request to delay discussions for one session  | Yes: 9<br>No: 270                   | Rejected | Won        |
| 4/06 | PDC 2600  | Itaipu  | Project voting  | Yes: 285<br>No: 54                  | Approved | Won        |
| 4/13 | MP 512/10 | Tax incentive for automotive industries installed in the North, Northeast, and Midwest regions                                  | PT DVS extinguishing benefits conceded by the PM to undertakings installed or that come to be installed in municipalities covered by the Northeast Development Superintendence (Sudene) | Yes: 333<br>No: 41<br>Abstention: 7 | Rejected | Lost       |
| 4/26 | MP 513/10 | Allows the union to subsidize BNDES loans with lower interest rates for rural concerns in regions affected by natural disasters | PSDB DVS targeted at removing permission afforded the union to allocate public debt securities as resources of the Brazilian Sovereign Fund (FSB) from the text                         | Yes: 272<br>No: 72                  | Rejected | Won        |
| 4/27 | MP 514/10 | Second phase of the <i>Minha Casa, Minha Vida</i> program (Social Program for Housing)  | Request to delay for one session  | Yes: 55<br>No: 339<br>Abstention: 2 | Rejected | Won        |

|      |                     |   |   |                                      |          |      |
|------|---------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|----------|------|
| 5/10 | MP 521/10           | Increase the grant amount for resident doctors, change the form of affiliation to Social Security, and assure maternity and paternity leave for these professionals | Request to remove from agenda   | Yes: 17<br>No: 263<br>Abstention: 4  | Rejected | Won  |
| 5/18 | Opposition Petition | Summoning of Antonio Palocci  | Opposition petition to summon former Minister Antonio Palocci   | Yes: 72<br>No: 263<br>Abstention: 8  | Rejected | Won  |
| 5/18 | MP 517/10           | Tax incentives  | Concession of tax incentives to sectors of the economy  | Yes: 17<br>No: 263<br>Abstention: 4  | Rejected | Won  |
| 5/24 | Amendment           | Forestry Code   | Global substitute amendment   | Yes: 410<br>No: 63<br>Abstention: 1  | Approved | Won  |
| 5/25 | Amendment           | Forestry Code   | Amendment 114 submitted by the PMDB   | Yes: 273<br>No: 182<br>Abstention: 2 | Approved | Lost |
| 5/25 | MP 517/10           | Concession of tax incentives to sectors of the economy  | PSDB DVS targeted at removing the extension of the Global Reversal Reserve (RGR) up to 2035 from the text   | Yes: 270<br>No: 101<br>Abstention: 2 | Rejected | Won  |
| 5/25 | MP 517/10           | Concession of tax incentives to sectors of the economy  | PPS-PV DVS that wanted to extend the Global Reversal Reserve (RGR) up to 2015, instead of 2035, as provided in the PM text  | Yes: 94<br>No: 257                   | Rejected | Won  |
| 5/25 | MP 517/10           | Concession of tax incentives to sectors of the economy  | DEM DVS targeted at removing from the text the provision for charging monthly capitalized interest on loans extended by the Higher Education Student Financing Fund | Yes: 265<br>No: 118                  | Rejected | Won  |

**Annex I**  
**Continued**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Bill</b> | <b>Topic</b>   | <b>Issue</b>   | <b>Score</b>                        | <b>Result</b> | <b>Government</b> |
|-------------|-------------|--|--|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 6/15        | MP 527/11   | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)                | Request to remove from agenda  | Yes: 7<br>No: 271<br>Abstention: 1  | Rejected      | Won               |
| 6/15        | MP 527/11   | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)                | Request to remove from agenda  | Yes: 7<br>No: 262<br>Abstention: 2  | Rejected      | Won               |
| 6/15        | MP 527/11   | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)                | Conversion law bill  | Yes: 272<br>No: 76<br>Abstention: 3 | Approved      | Won               |
| 6/28        | MP 527/11   | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)                | DEM DVS, targeted at excluding the entire chapter from the PM text on the new rules for construction undertakings for the Confederations Cup (2013), World Cup (2014), and Olympics and Paralympics (2016)   | Yes: 264<br>No: 88                  | Rejected      | Won               |
| 6/28        | MP 517/10   | Concession of tax incentives to sectors of the economy | PSDB DVS to exclude mandatory public administration usage of the price lists pertaining to the National System for Research and Costs of Civil Construction Indexes and the Highway Construction Undertakings Cost System to calculate the global costs of undertakings and engineering services | Yes: 310<br>No: 96<br>Abstention: 2 | Rejected      | Won               |

|      |           |  |   |                                     |          |     |
|------|-----------|--|---|-------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| 6/28 | MP 527/11 | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)  | PSDB DVS targeted at excluding integrated contracting from the text, in other words, the way of tendering construction undertakings and engineering services in which the contracted party executes all phases, from the basic project up to the delivery of the undertaking ready to use (turnkey) | Yes: 247<br>No: 83<br>Abstention: 2 | Rejected | Won |
| 6/28 | MP 527/11 | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)  | PSDB DVS targeted at excluding from the text the possibility of the winning company of the bid through the integrated contracting modality, and to produce the basic construction project   | Yes: 238<br>No: 75<br>Abstention: 1 | Rejected | Won |
| 6/28 | MP 527/11 | Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC)  | DEM DVS targeted at excluding from the PM the attribute given the Civil Aviation Department for preparing and approving authorization plans for airports  | Yes: 238<br>No: 75<br>Abstention: 1 | Rejected | Won |
| 7/05 | MP 528/11 | Correction of the Income Tax Table for Individuals and allowance of 4.5% deductions annually, up to 2014 | PSDB DVS proposing an adjustment of 5.9% of the IRPF table for 2011. The PM provides an adjustment of 4.5% for 2011 to 2014.  | Yes: 79<br>No: 229                  | Rejected | Won |
| 7/05 | MP 528/11 | Correction of the Income Tax Table for Individuals and allowance of 4.5% deductions annually, up to 2014 | DEM DVS proposing an adjustment of IRPF deductions for education through the INPC plus 5% per year  | Yes: 99<br>No: 260<br>Abstention: 1 | Rejected | Won |

**Annex II**  
**Senate—Voting sessions analyzed**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Bill</b>             | <b>Theme</b>  | <b>Issue</b>  | <b>Score</b>                       | <b>Result</b> | <b>Government</b> |
|-------------|-------------------------|---|---|------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 2/08        | PLV 15/2010             | Social Security taxation for individual micro-entrepreneurs | Enables differentiated treatment for Social Security levying for individual micro-entrepreneurs   | Yes: 49<br>No: 15                  | Approved      | Won               |
| 2/23        | Amendment highlight # 1 | Minimum wage  | Amendment highlight # 1, authored by the PSDB, in an attempt to establish the minimum wage at R\$600.00.  | Yes: 17<br>No: 55<br>Abstention: 5 | Rejected      | Won               |
| 2/23        | Amendment highlight # 3 | Minimum wage  | Amendment highlight # 3, authored by the DEM, in an attempt to establish the minimum wage at R\$560.00  | Yes: 19<br>No: 54<br>Abstention: 4 | Rejected      | Won               |
| 2/23        | Amendment highlight # 5 | Minimum wage  | Amendment highlight # 5, authored by Sen. Itamar Franco (PPS-MG), targeted at suppressing the provision that authorizes the Executive Branch to define the minimum wage up to 2015 via decree                             | Yes: 20<br>No: 54<br>Abstention: 3 | Rejected      | Won               |
| 3/01        | MP 503/10               | Public Olympic Authority                                    | Ratifies the Protocol of Intentions signed by the Union, State of Rio de Janeiro, and Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, with the purpose of constructing a public consortium denominated the Public Olympic Authority (APO) | Yes: 46<br>No: 10<br>Abstention: 0 | Approved      | Won               |
| 3/01        | MP 503/10               | Public Olympic Authority                                    | Conversion Law Bill # 2, of 2011  | Yes: 46<br>No: 13<br>Abstention: 0 | Approved      | Won               |



|             |            |   |  |                                    |          |     |
|-------------|------------|---|--|------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| <b>3/01</b> | MP 505/10  | Constitutes an additional source of funding for the Social and Economic Development Bank (BNDES)  | Conversion Law Bill # 3, of 2011   | Yes: 33<br>No: 8<br>Abstention: 1  | Approved | Won |
| <b>4/05</b> | PLV 6/2011 | Alters the composition of the Regional Labor Court of the Fourth Region (RS) and other provisions | Presuppositions of relevance and urgency and financial and budgetary adequacy of PM # 510, of 2010   | Yes: 43<br>No: 14                  | Approved | Won |
| <b>4/13</b> | MP 511/11  | High-speed train  | Voting on the presuppositions of relevance and urgency and financial and budgetary adequacy of the PM  | Yes: 46<br>No: 19                  | Approved | Won |
| <b>4/13</b> | MP 511/11  | High-speed train  | Voting on the Conversion Bill of Law   | Yes: 44<br>No: 17<br>Abstention: 0 | Approved | Won |
| <b>5/24</b> | MPV 515/10 | Credit in Favor of Labor Justice and Executive Branch departments                                 | Opens an extraordinary credit in favor of Labor, Justice, and various departments of the Executive Branch, at a global amount of R\$26,673,264,196, for specified purposes | Yes: 46<br>No: 17                  | Approved | Won |
| <b>6/01</b> | MP 517/10  | Tax incentives  | Voting on constitutional presuppositions of relevance and urgency and financial and budgetary adequacy of the PM   | Yes: 34<br>No: 19<br>Abstention: 3 | Approved | Won |
| <b>6/01</b> | MP 517/10  | Tax incentives  | Petition # 638, of 2011, authored by Senator Alvaro Dias, requesting DVS of Amendment # 49   | Yes: 18<br>No: 37<br>Abstention: 3 | Rejected | Won |
| <b>6/01</b> | MP 517/10  | Tax incentives  | Voting on the Conversion Bill of Law   | Yes: 43<br>No: 17<br>Abstention: 3 | Approved | Won |

**Annex II**  
**Continued**

| <b>Date</b> | <b>Bill</b> | <b>Theme</b>  | <b>Issue</b>  | <b>Score</b>                       | <b>Result</b> | <b>Government</b> |
|-------------|-------------|---|---|------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 6/01        | MP 520/10   | Authorizes the Executive Branch to create public company <i>Empresa Brasileira de Serviços Hospitalares</i> S.A.—EBSERH, and other provisions | Constitutional presuppositions of relevance and urgency and financial and budgetary adequacy of the PM  | Yes: 40<br>No: 13<br>Abstention: 2 | Approved      | Won               |
| 6/14        | MP 525/11   | Temporary hiring of teachers  | Constitutional presuppositions of relevance and urgency, and financial and budgetary adequacy of the PM   | Yes: 47<br>No: 13                  | Approved      | Won               |
| 6/14        | MPV 525/11  | Temporary hiring of teachers  | Alters Law # 8.745, dated December 9, 1993, providing for the hiring of teachers  | Yes: 49<br>No: 12<br>Abstention: 0 | Approved      | Won               |
| 7/06        | PLV 17/2011 | RDC   | Creates the Differentiated Public Contracting Regime (RDC) for the 10 dozen contracts necessary for the 2014 World Cup, Confederations Cup of 2013, and 2016 Olympics | Yes: 46<br>No: 18                  | Approved      | Won               |